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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
task with which they are faced is to deter the social drinker from
driving and to eliminate the dangers which the intoxicated motorist
presents on our public highways, all with a view towards insuring
the solidarity of the public welfare. Admittedly, the implied con-
sent statute may properly form the foundation necessary to an
attainment of that ideal goal. But legislation without adequate
driver education and responsibility will never be effective.8 7 Quite
obviously then, the Ohio legislature must -not remain satisfied with
their new creation, for further study is still needed to produce "a
dearer picture of how much sacrifice of which values will be
required to assure what degree of safety.""es
TERENCE J. CLARK
TfE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - STATUTORY
REFORM
OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Page Supp. 1967).
The recent amendments to the Ohio perpetuities statute1 place
Ohio among an increasing number of states that have modified
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities in order to eliminate
its unrealistic harshness by affording a more rational mechanism
to regulate restraints on alienation? Under the common law rule
codified by statute in 1932, any interest in real or personal prop-
erty which by any remote possibility might vest, if at all, beyond
a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest and 21 years
thereafter was void from its inception.4 The rule accomplishes
its basic purpose of preventing unreasonable restraints on the alien-
United States makes stiffer penalties lead only to more difficulty in enforcement
Crampton, The Drinking Driver: What Legal Controls?, 12 LAw QUAD. NOTES 8,
10 (Univ. of Mich. 1968).
67This is the conclusion of the 4th International Conference on Alcohol and
Traffic Safety. Penner, Alcohol and Traffic Safety, 36 MANITOBA BAR NEWS 75-79
(1967). In a conference on traffic safety and the courts at John Carroll University
the new statutory scheme was lauded by a majority of the participants. Chief Justice
of the Ohio Supreme Court, Kingsley A. Taft, in acknowledging the driver to be the
most important factor in highway safety, expressed the opinion that stiffer penalties
serve as a deterrent to both the violator and others. Cleveland Common Pleas Judge
August Pryatel, however, observed that the new laws were commendable to a point,
but they left the human factor untouched: the ignorant must be taught, the careless
converted, the reckless punished, and the defiant grounded. The Cleveland Plain
Dealer, May 4, 1968, at 13, col. 3.
68 J. KATz, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW 588 (1967).
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ability of property by indirectly limiting the time within which
future interests must vest. However, application of the rule in
its classic form destroyed all future interests which represented
only possible violations at the time of their creation without regard
to events which happened thereafter, and thus was unnecessarily
I OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (Page Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CODE)
now provides that:
(A) No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after a life or lives in being at the
creation of the interest.... It is the intention by the adoption of this sec-
tion to make effective in Ohio what is generally known as the common law
against perpetuities, except as set forth in paragraphs (B) and (C) of this
section.
(B) For the purposes of this section, the time of the creation of an in-
terest in real or personal property subject to a power reserved by the grantor
to revoke or terminate such interest shall be the time at which such reserved
power expires, either by reason of the death of the grantor or by release of
the power or otherwise.
(C) Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule
against perpetuities, under paragraph (A) hereof, shall be reformed, within the
limits of the rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of
the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate the rule and
in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual
rather than possible events.
(D) Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this section shall be effective with respect
to interests in real or personal property created by wills of decedents dying
after December 31, 1967, and with respect to interests in real or personal
property created by inter vivos instruments executed after December 31, 1967,
and with respect to interests in real or personal property created by inter
vivos instruments executed on or before December 31, 1967 which by reason of
paragraph (B) of this section will be treated as interest in real or personal
Property which comes into effect through the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment shall be regarded as having been created by the instrument exercising
the power rather than the instrument which created the power. [Amended
wording italicized.]
Paragraph (C) of the new Ohio statute is a carbon copy of the Vermont perpe-
tuities statute adopted in 1957. VT. STAT. ANN. ti. 27, § 501 (1967). Kentucky
enacted a slightly modified version of the same statute in 1960. KY. REV. STAT. §
381.216 (1962). Other states have enacted various combinations of the basic "wait-
and-see" and "cy pres" reforms. See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 715.2 (West Supp.
1966) (reformation allowed); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-95 (1960) ("wait-
and-see"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101, 102 (1965) ("wait-and-see" and
reformation of age contingency); Mo. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 197A (1966 replacement)
("wait-and-see" and reformation of age contingency); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
184A, §§ 1, 2 (1958) ("wait-and-see" and reformation of age contingency); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (b) (1950) ("wait-and-see"). For a comprehensive compara-
tive analysis of these various statutes, see A.B.A. Perpetuity Legislation Handbook, 2
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRusT J. 178, 188-204 (1967).
3 114 Ohio Laws 320 (1932).
4See, e.g., Gwinner v. Schoeny, 111 Ohio App. 177, 171 N.E.2d 309 (1960);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. McQuade, 106 Ohio App. 237, 142 N.E.2d 249 (1957); Abram
v. Wilson, 8 Ohio Misc. 420, 220 N.E.2d 739 (P. Ct. 1966); Thomas v. Harrison, 92
Ohio L Abs. 175, 191 N.E.2d 862 (P. Ct. 1962); Rudolph v. Schmalstig, 9 Ohio Op.
452, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 249 (C.P. 1937). See generally 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§§ 24.12-.25 (1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.].
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harsh in effecting its purpose. Under the new amendments, a
violation of the rule is determined not by what events might have
happened, but by events that actually transpire.
The new amendments institute what is known as a broad "wait-
and-see" policy coupled with broad "cy pres" powers. "Wait-and-
see" means that rather than voiding a contingent future interest
at its creation because of some hypothetical possibility that it might
vest too remotely, the court must wait to see whether as actual
events unfold the interest does in fact vest, or become certain to
vest, beyond the period allowed. If the event upon which the
vesting of a future interest is contingent does in fact occur, or
become certain to occur, within 21 years after the death of a
relevant life in being at the creation of the interest, the interest
is valid. If the interest in question -has not yet vested, but there
is still a possibility that it may vest in time, decision as to its
validity must be postponed until it does in fact vest within the
period of the rule or timely vesting becomes certain. However,
should it happen that by the operation of actual events it becomes
certain that under the terms of the instrument which, created the
interest, vesting will occur beyond the period of the rule, "cy pres"
must be employed by the court whereby the creating instrument
will be reformed, within the limits of the rule, to approximate
most closely the intention of the creator of the interest.' Since
in the past the vesting of most future interests voided as violative
of the Rule Against Perpetuities was contingent upon an event
that in all probability would have occured within 21 years after
the death of a relevant life in being at the creation of the interest,
or could easily have been reformed to insure timely vesting, it is
apparent that the new statutory reform will save the vast majority
of future interests that would have been invalid under the old
rule.7
The operation of the new reforms can be illustrated by demon-
strating how the recent case of Abram v. Wilsone would be decided
5 Paragraph (C) of the new statute provides that "[i]n determining whether an
interest would violate the rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities
shall be measured by actual rather than possible events." CODE § 2131.08(C) (emphasis
added). Like the concise statement of the common law rule, this statutory language
is deceptively simple. See note 25 infra & accompanying text.
6 CODE § 2131.08 (C).
7The provision of the new statute providing for reformation is mandatory in that
it demands that all interests which will violate the rule "shall" be reformed. Thus,
the only interests that will fail under the new statute are those which fail by their own
terms notwithstanding reformation. See note 14 infra.
8 8 Ohio Misc. 420, 220 N.E.2d 739 (P. Ct. 1966).
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under the new statute. In that case, a testator had bequeathed
the residue of his estate in trust to pay the net income to his
grandnieces and grandnephews until the youngest should reach
age 35, remainder in fee to the beneficiaries. Finding that "grand-
nieces" and "grandnephews" meant those whenever born, the court,
applying the common law rule, held the entire gift void because
of the unlikely possibility that the testator's brother, age 75, might
have another child born after the testator's death who in turn
might produce a grandnephew or grandniece more than 21 years
after the death of the brother and his children alive at the testator's
death.9 Under "wait-and-see," the validity of the gift to the grand-
nieces and grandnephews might be demonstrated immediately by
showing that the testator's brother at age 75 was incapable of
fathering a child.'" If this could not be established, the trust
would be continued and decision as to the validity of the gift would
be postponed." If at the brother's death he has in fact produced
no after-born children (the most probable result), the validity of
the gift would be established because all possible members of the
class would have to be born within the lifetimes of nephews and
nieces living at the testator's death. If, however, the testator's
brother should produce another child after the testator's death, no
determination of validity could be made until that after-born child
dies or can be proved incapable of conceiving a child.'" If the after-
9 It is apparent that the court construed the gifts to grandnieces and grandnephews
as vested in interest at birth subject to open to let in later-born members of the class
and that only possession was postponed until the youngest member of the class reached
age 35. However, under the "all-or-nothing" rule of class gifts, if the interest of any
member of the class might vest too remotely, the gift is void as to every member of
the class and the entire gift fails. Thus, since the remote possibility existed that a
"grandnephew" or "grandniece" could have been born to an after-born nephew or
niece later than 21 years after the testator's death, the court declared the entire gift
void.
1OSee R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINsT PERPIETUITIES 71 (1966). For a
discussion of the problems raised by a possible adoption, see Lynn, Raising the Perpe-
tuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See" and Cy Pres, 17 VAND. L. REV.
1391 (1964).
11 It should be noted that the "wait-and-see" approach to the determination of
validity is the antithesis of the approach employed under the old rule. Whereas under
the old statute an interest was void if there was any possibility that it would vest too
remotely, under "wait-and-see," no determination of invalidity can be made if there
is any possibility that the interest will vest in time.
_12Although prospective reformation at this point would be convenient, the word-
ing of the new statute seems to preclude reformation until a violation is certain to
occur. Since at this point the after-born child could die without producing any chil-
dren of his own, it is still possible that "actual events" may vest all interests in time
without reformation. However, should the after-born child survive all nephews and
nieces that were alive at the testator's death, reformation should be granted in order
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
born child produces a child later than 21 years after the death of
the brother and the survivor of the nephews and nieces alive at
the testator's death, the gift to grandnephews and grandnieces would
be bad under "wait-and-see" alone because by the operation of
"actual events" the interest of a member of the donative class has
vested beyond the period allowed by the rule. 3 However, the gift
would be saved under "cy pres" by reforming the trust to limit
the possible beneficiaries to "my grandnephews and grandnieces
living at my death and those born within a period measured by
the lives of my brother and his children alive at my death and
21 years." Thus, in order to save the gift to the class, the remote
member is excluded by reformation. The rationale for excluding
the remote beneficiary is that the testator would have preferred the
exclusion to the failure of the entire gift which would cause an in-
testacy with respect to the trust corpus. In other words, "cy pres"
is employed to obviate the harsh "all-or-nothing" rule of class gifts.
In so doing, the trust is preserved in accordance with the testator's
intention and, since no interest does in fact vest later than the period
prescribed by the rule, there is no infringement upon the policy
against restraints on alienation.
Where vesting is contingent upon the attainment of a certain
age beyond 21, a gift may be saved under "cy pres" by simply
reducing the age requirement to 21.", Also, the new reforms will
save gifts which are limited to take effect after a period in gross
not specifically related to lives in being. For example, if a testator
to allow distribution when the youngest child of nephews and nieces living at the
testators death reaches age 35.
15 As to whether the grandnephews and grandnieces alive at the testator's death
could be measuring lives under the "wait-and-see," see text accompanying note 25
infra. It would appear that if the child of the after-born nephew or niece is born
within the lifetime of the grandnephews and grandnieces living at the testator's
death, or within 21 years after the death of the survivor of them, his interest might be
held valid.
14 If T devises property "to A for life remainder to A's children who reach 25,"
the remainder is void under the old rule because after-born children of A might reach
25 later than 21 years after lives in being at T's death. Under "wait-and-see,"
decision as to the validity of the remainder would be postponed until A's death. If
at that time it is discovered that all A's children were born before 7's death, or that
all are over 4 years old (and hence will reach 25 not later than 21 years after the
death of A), the gift is valid and no reformation is necessary. If, however, there are
after-born children under 4 years of age, the gift must be reformed to vest the re-
mainder in "such of A's children who reach 21." W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE
AGAiNsT PERPET riss 229 (1957). See Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900
(1891) (age contingency reduced from 40 to 21). It should be noted that if none
of A's children live to age 21, the gift will fail by its own terms and the property will
pass to T's intestate takers. It is therefore evident that "wait-and-see" and "cy pres"
do not absolutely insure vesting.
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bequeathed certain legacies to his descendants alive at the time his
estate should be settled, the legacies are void ab initio under the old
statute because of the remote possibility that the estate would not
be settled within 21 years after the testator's death. 5 Under the
new statute, the legacies would be valid if in fact the estate is settled
within 21 years after the testator's death." If a testamentary trust
had been created with absolute discretion in a corporate trustee to se-
lect which of a class of beneficiaries should receive income, the in-
terest of each beneficiary was deemed contingent upon the exercise of
discretion by the trustee and since the trustee could conceivably
make payments in favor of after-born members of the class later
than 21 years after the death of the testator, the gift to the entire
class of beneficiaries was void under the old statute. 7 The trust
would be valid under the new statute if in fact no potential bene-
ficiaries are born after the testator's death, or the trustee vests the
interests of all possible beneficiaries by making payments within the
21 year period after the testator's death. 8 By making the test for
validity depend upon actual rather than possible events, the new re-
forms have also abolished the absurd results occasioned under the
old rule in cases involving the "unborn widow," the "fertile octo-
genarian," and the "precocious toddler."' 9
The most difficult problem in applying the new statute will be
the selection of appropriate measuring lives. Under the old statute's
certainty-of-vesting test, the selection of the appropriate measuring
life or lives was no problem, because in order to validate a given
interest it was essential that at the time of creation one could
identify a person, or a reasonably small group of persons, alive at
the time of creation within 21 years of whose death the interest
was certain to vest. That is, the selection of measuring lives under
the old statute was a matter of logical necessity. However, under
"wait-and-see," since the validity of the interest is no longer depend-
ent upon a showing that it is certain to vest within the period of
15 6 A.L.P., supra note 4, at § 24.23. Cf. Rudolph v. Schmalstig, 9 Ohio Op. 452,
25 Ohio L. Abs. 249 (C.P. 1937).
16 If the estate is not settled until later than 21 years after the testator's death, the
gift would probably be held void under the new statute because there are no measur-
ing lives causally related to vesting. See J. DUKEMINIBR, PERPETTUTIES LAW iN
AcTION 88 (1962). It also appears that there would be no practical way of reform-
ing the gift to save it from invalidity. See R. LYNN, supra note 10, at 75-76.
17 Thomas v. Harrison, 191 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
1 8 If the trustee should make payments to an after-born beneficiary beyond the
period of the rule, there would seem to be no reason why a court should not exclude
the remote beneficiary by reformation in order to save the trust.
19 See Leach, Perpetuities it; a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
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the rule, but only that it may vest in time, one is no longer
compelled at the beginning to identify the appropriate measuring
life, but is faced with the new problem of formulating rules whereby
the appropriate life may 'be determined in retrospect. To illustrate
the difficulty, suppose that a testator bequeaths $100,000 in trust
to pay the income to Case Western Reserve University for 121
years, remainder in fee to his issue then living. The remainder is
of course void under the old statute for it cannot be determined as
a matter of logical necessity that the remainder interests will vest
within 21 years after the death of a life in being at the testator's
death. However, the new statute provides that "[in determining
whether an interest would violate the rule and in reforming an
interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual
rather than possible events."2  A literal reading of this provision
would validate the remainder if counsel could identify from the
birth records some centurian who was alive at the testator's death
and who lived for 100 years thereafter. However, the consensus
among the writers seems to be that for a person to function as a
validating measuring life under "wait-and-see," his life must in
some manner causally restrict the time within which vesting may
occur for otherwise the policy of the rule will be subverted."1 Thus,
since the life of a random centurian in no way causally restricts
the period within which vesting may occur, the remainder in the
testator's issue should be held void under the new statute unless
it can be brought within the rule by reformation.22
20 COD] § 2131.08 (C).
21 See authorities listed in A.B.A. Perpetuity Legislation Handbook, supra note 2,
at 210-12. An individual has a "causal relation" to vesting if by the terms of the
creating instrument, his life or death somehow restricts the time within which vest-
ing may occur. For example, in a devise to the grandchildren of A, A's children
alive at the critical time can be measuring lives since their deaths will define the
period within which grandchildren can be born. Also, in a devise to A's children
living upon the death of the survivor of B's children, B's children living at the
critical time can be measuring lives because their lives have been made relevant to
the time of vesting by the express terms of the creating instrument. These examples
are not intended to exhaust the infinite variety of situations where a question of the
appropriateness of a given life is at issue, rather they are merely illustrative of what
is meant by "causal relation." Seemingly, the Kentucky statute solves the problem
by expressly limiting the selection of measuring lives to those lives having "a causal
relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest." KY. REV. STAT. § 381.216
(1962). However, like Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967), the Ohio
statute places no express limits on the selection of measuring lives.
For a savings clause designed to obviate any adverse consequences stemming from
the ambiguity of the new statute with respect to the selection of measuring lives, see
Goldman, Drafting Trust Instruments Revisited, 36 U. OCN. L REv. 650, 657 (1967).
22The trust might be reformed by reducing its duration from 121 years to 21
years. However, in reforming an interest within the limits of the rule, the court is
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Taking a more realistic example to illustrate the difficulty of
selecting measuring lives, suppose a testator bequeaths certain prop-
erty "to the grandchildren of A who attain 21," and that A and
one of A's children (B) survive the testator."5 Three years later A
has another child (C) and then A dies. If C dies without children,
the interests of B's children would be valid under the new statute with-
out reformation because all of B's children will come of age no later
than 21 years after B's death. However, if C should have children,
his life cannot be used as a measuring life because he was not in
being at the testator's death, and it could be argued that B's life is
not causally related to the vesting of the interests in C's children
so that reformation would be necessary to save the interests in B's
children by excluding C's children. However, unlike using a ran-
dom centurian as a validating life, allowing B to function as meas-
uring life for C's children would not seem to occasion any infringe-
ment on the policy against restraints on alienation and a court could
easily feel justified in not insisting on strict causation. 4 In any
event, it is apparent that there are no criteria explicit in the new
statute for determining who can be measuring lives in the infinite
variety of situations that will arise, and thus the rules that will gov-
ern the selection of measuring lives must be developed case-by-case
through the process of judicial decision."
Paragraph (B) of the new statute relates to when the period
bound to approximate most closely the testator's intention. A court might very well
find that such a drastic reduction in the length of the trust might so severly distort
the testamentary scheme so as to preclude any reformation.
2 3 This gift is void under the old statute because A could have another child born
after the testator's death whose child (grandchild of A) could reach 21 at a remote
time.
24 It has been suggested that B's life does causally restrict the vesting of the interests
in the children of C because B's death may dose the class of recipients. That is, as
long as B remains alive the class will stay open under applicable class-dosing rules
and thereby prevent vesting. See A.B.A. Perpetuity Legislation Handbook, sapra note
2, at 185.
25 It would appear that the choice of the appropriate measuring life in any given
situation arising under the new statute will lie somewhere between the extremes of
any one of the babies in the world living at the testator's death and that spedfic life
which would validate the interest by applying the old rule with the benefit of hind-
sight. In terms of policy considerations, both extremes would be untenable for
allowing selection of the measuring life from all the babies in the world alive at the
time the interest was created would destroy the new statute as an effective regulator
of restraints on alienation, and insisting on a strict causal relationship between an
acceptable validating life and the vesting of the interest would occasion the exercise
of interests by reformation which represent no real infringement upon the basic policy.
Since the statute is silent on how measuring lives are to be chosen, the burden is thrust
on the judiciary to formulate rules for their selection which will allow the fullest
effectuation of the testator's intent, and still preserve the underlying policy against
unreasonable restraints on alienation.
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of perpetuities begins to run against interests created under an
inter vivos transfer wherein the grantor has reserved a power to
revoke or terminate the future interests he creates by the transfer.
This provision makes it clear that with respect to future interests
created under an inter vivos trust wherein the settlor retains an
absolute power to revoke the entire trust, the period of perpetuities
begins to run when the power to revoke expires which will be the
date of the settlor's death unless he has released his power before
his death. However, the wording of the provision is ambiguous
with respect to its application to interests created under a trust
where the settlor merely retains a power to change beneficiaries as
opposed to a power to revoke the entire trust. Paragraph (B)
provides that "the time of the creation of an interest ... subject to
a power reserved by the grantor to revoke or terminate such inter-
est shall be the time at which such reserved power expires .... ,26
Since the words "revoke or terminate" are used in the disjunctive,
it would appear that "terminate" was intended to describe a reserved
power to end specific interests other than by "revoking" the entire
trust. Thus, it could be argued that where a settlor creates an
irrevocable trust reserving a power to change beneficiaries, he has
reserved the power to "terminate" the interests of named benefi-
ciaries within the meaning of the statute and therefore the period
of perpetuities does not begin to run against these interests until
the settlor dies. However, since it could be argued that "terminate"
is merely synonymous with "revoke" when paragraph (B) is applied
to trusts, whether a settlor can postpone the running of the period
of perpetuities by merely reserving a power to change beneficiaries
will have to await judicial construction 7
Paragraph (D) of the new statute is primarily concerned with
the effective date of the new amendments. However, the last
2 6 CODE § 2131.08 (B) (emphasis added).
277Te general rule is that the period of perpetuities begins to run against a future
interest at the time of its creation. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 4, at § 24.12. Although it
appears that no Ohio court has decided the point, other jurisdictions applying the com-
mon law rule generally hold that the period of perpetuities does not begin to run against
interests created under a revocable inter vivos trust until the settlor's death. See, e.g.,
Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 SE.2d 461 (1958); Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342,
64 A.2d 258 (1949). The policy rationale for this position is that since the settlor
can revoke the trust at any time before his death and then seU the property composing
the trust corpus, property is not tied up until his death when the power to revoke
expires. This policy rationale is not apposite when the trust is irrevocable because
the settlor has no power of sale. Yet, in a very real sense, the interests of the benefid-
aries under an irrevocable trust where the settlor retains a power to change beneficiaries
are not "created" until the settlor's death because until then they are subject to destruc-
tion (termination) by the exercise of the settlor's power to substitute other beneficiaries.
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sentence concerning interests "created in the exercise of power of
appointment is extremely ambiguous and will cause litigation. The
sentence provides that:
An interest in real or personal property which comes into effect
through the exercise of a power of appointment shall be regarded
as having been created by the instrument exercising the power
rather than the instrument which created the power.28
Because this provision appears in paragraph (D) which concerns
the effective date of the provisions in paragraphs (B) and (C),
it could be argued that the last sentence of paragraph (D) merely
instructs that "wait-and-see" and "cy pres" are to be applied to
interests created by powers exercised after the effective date of
the statute even though the instrument creating the power became
effective before the effective date of the statute.29 However, the
broad language of the last sentence seems inconsistent with such a
narrow purpose, and the use of such general language indicates that
this sentence should be read independently from the rest of the para-
graph."0 If the sentence is read literally, it would mean that with
respect to all interests created in the exercise of powers, the period of
perpetuities will always be ,measured from the time the power is ex-
ercised rather than from the time of creation. Such a construction
would greatly expand the interests which the donee of a special or
general testamentary power may create and would make possible the
creation of a family trust in perpetuity through a succession of powers
of appointment. 3' Although a literal reading of this provision
28 CoDr § 2131.08 (D).
29 That the statute in force at the time of exercise controls the validity of the
interests created was established in First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin, 49 Ohio L. Abs.
29, 73 N.E.2d 388 (C.P. 1947), holding that the 1932 perpetuities statute applied to
interests created by a power exercised in 1945 even though the instrument creating
the power became effective in 1914.
30 Other state statutes expressly making perpetuities reform provisions applicable
to interests created by powers exercised after the effective date of the statute do so
specifically and in narrow language. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 502 (1967),
with ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 106 (1965). In view of the fact that paragraph (C)
of the new Ohio statute is obviously copied from the Vermont statute, the inconsistent
use by the Ohio legislature of such general language in the last sentence of paragraph
(D) would indicate that provision should be read broadly.
31 By way of illustration, assume that a testator bequeaths $100,000 in trust to
pay the net income to his son (A) for life, remainder to such of A's issue as A may by
will appoint, and that A has no children at the testator's death. Under the 1932
statute, the period of perpetuities with respect to interests which A may create in the
exercise of his power begins to run at the testator's death. Cleveland Trust Co. v.
McQuade, 106 Ohio App. 237, 142 N.E.2d 249 (1957). If A should exercise his
power by appointing a life estate in B (A's child born after the testator's death)
with a special testamentary power in B to appoint among his issue, B's power would
be invalid under the old statute. However, under the literal reading of the last
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would effect a substantial change in past Ohio law which distin-
guishes between presently exercisable general powers and powers
that are only exercisable by will or are otherwise limited, the policy
that such a construction would invoke is not without precedent
in other jurisdictions, and would not unjustifiably infringe upon
the basic policy of preventing unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion.3
2
It must be emphasized that the reform provisions of the new
statute are solely prospective in application,3 and that with respect
to future interests created before December 31, 1967, the former
statutes will apply." However, it is a fundamental tenet of juris-
sentence in paragraph (D), the period of perpetuities would be measured, not from
the testator's death (time of creation of A's power), but from the time of A's exercise,
and since B was a life in being at that time his power would be valid. Hence, B
in the exercise of his power could appoint a life estate in one of his children (C) with
a special testamentary power in C to appoint among his issue. Measured from the time
of B's exercise, Cs power would be valid. C could in turn appoint in the same fashion
to one of his children and so forth and so on in perpetuity. However, since each
successive donee would have the option to appoint fee title to the trust corpus to any
member of the appointive class, dead hand control over the disposition of property
is not absolute, and since most trustees have a free hand to sell the property composing
the trust corpus, there would be no real uneconomic restraint on the alienability of
property. In recognition of these realities, Delaware has adopted the position that
the period of perperuities is to be measured from the time of exercise, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit 25, § 501 (1953), and the federal estate tax makes special provision for the
taxation of such powers. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 20 4 1(a)(3). However, in
view of the ambiguous positioning of the provision relating to powers in the new
Ohio statute, whether Ohio has followed Delaware's lead will have to await judicial
construction.
It should be noted that if the last sentence of paragraph (D) of the new statute is
given the recommended literal reading, there will be adverse federal estate tax con-
sequences for the donee of a special testamentary power, who in the exercise thereof,
creates another power of appointment. As a general rule, the value of property with
respect to which a decedent holds and exercises a special power is not included in his
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(b).
However, by virtue of section 2041(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, if
any decedent "exercises a power of appointment. . . by cteating another power of ap-
pointment which under the applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to ...
suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such property, for a period
ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first power," then the
value of the property is included in the decedent's gross estate when calculating the
federal estate tax. Hence, in the previous example, the $100,000 trust corpus would
be includable in A's gross estate.
3 2 See note 31 supra.
3 3 The new amendments expressly apply to interests created by: (1) wills effective
after December 31, 1967; (2) inter vivos transfers executed after December 31, 1967;
(3) revocable inter vivos transfers executed on or before December 31, 1967, when the
power to revoke expires (by death or release) after December 31, 1967; (4) powers
of appointment exercised after December 31, 1967.
34With respect to interests created in real property by instruments becoming
effective between December 17, 1811, and January 1, 1932, validity for perpetuities
purposes is governed by the 1811 statute, An Act to Restrict the Entailment of Real
Estate, 10 Ohio Laws 7 (1811), repealed, 114 Ohio Laws 475 (1932). See Joseph
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prudence that when the legislature modifies a rule of the common
law reflecting a significant change in policy, courts should look to
that new policy and reason from it by analogy in formulating rules
of decision under the common law. 5 Thus, it has been persuasively
argued that where the legislature modifies the Rule Against Per-
petuities, the courts in deciding cases not expressly covered by the
new statute should nonetheless adopt the new policy as a matter
of common law.36  However, since 1811, the Rule Against Per-
petuities in Ohio has been governed by statute.3" Yet, there is
strong authority that the 1811 statute applied only to interests in
real property and that with respect to interests in personalty
created between 1811 and 1932 the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities is applicable."8 Thus, in cases arising after October 24,
1967 (effective date of new amendments) involving interests created
under trusts effective before January 1, 1932, a strong argument
can be made that a court deciding a perpetuities question should
look to the policy of the new statute and adopt the principles of
"wait-and-see" and "cy pres" as a matter of common law. 9 Since
the 1932 statute expressly states that its intent is to adopt the
common law rule, it would appear that a similar argument might
Schonthal Co. v. Village of Sylvania, 60 Ohio App. 407, 21 N.E.2d 1008 (1938)
(holding that the 1811 statute applied to interests created in 1900 but not challenged
until after the passage of the 1932 statute). With respect to interests created in
personal property by instruments effective between 1811 and 1932, there is a conflict
as to whether the common law rule applies. See Sager v. Byrer, 24 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
129 (C.P. 1921), aff'd, 19 Ohio L. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1922) (adopting the
view that the common law rule does not apply); Dayton v. Phillips, 11 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 680 (Super. Ct. 1892), aff'd sub nom, Phillips v. Herron, 55 Ohio St.
478, 45 N.E. 720 (1896) (holding the common law rule applicable to interests in
personal property) (The Ohio Supreme Court did not consider this question on
appeal). It would appear the better view is that the common law rule does apply to
interests in personal property created between 1811 and 1932. 42 OHIO JJR. 2D
Perpetuities § 11 (1960). With respect to interests created in real and personal
property by instruments effective between January 1, 1932, and December 31, 1967,
the 1932 statute controls.
35 Pound, The Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908); Landis,
Statutes and Sources of the Law, 1934 HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213.
36See W. LEACH & 0. TuoR, supra note 14, at 231-36.
87 See note 34 supra.
381d.
39 This argument is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire has adopted "cy pres" and "wait-and-see" by judicial decision. See Mer-
chants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Edgerly v. Barker,
66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891). The possibility that litigation may arise under
instruments effective before 1932 should not be dismissed as remote in view of the
fact that future interests are often challenged many years after their creation. See
Joseph Schonthal Co. v. Village of Sylvania, 60 Ohio App. 407, 21 N.E. 2d 1008
(1938) (executory interest challenged 38 years after creation).
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conceivably be made for the adoption of "wait-and-see" and "cy
pres" in deciding perpetuities questions in respect of interests in
both real and personal property created by instruments effective
after 1932.
It is apparent that the new reform provisions effect a drastic
change in the application of -the Rule Against Perpetuities and
that most contingent future interests void under the old rule will
now be saved. However, it should 'be cautioned that the new
reforms do not abrogate the common law rule - they merely
modify it. "Wait-and-see" and "cy pres" are employed within the
contextual framework of the common law rule. The concepts of
vested and contingent interests, of vesting in interest as opposed
to possession, and of lives in being plus 21 years remain. The
new reforms do not lengthen the period in which a future interest
may remain contingent and they do not guarantee vesting. The
thrust of the reforms will be to eliminate the drafting pitfalls that
caused future interests, otherwise valid, to be cut down by some
potential violation, theoretically possible, which -in reality would
almost never occur. Thus, the reforms effectively preserve the
policy of prohibiting uneconomic restraints on the alienability of
property while they do away with the unnecessary harshness of the
old rule. Although the new statute is not without interpretive
difficulties,4 ° it should be welcomed as a long-overdue successful
effort to interject some semblance of reason into the citadel of
irrationality that has plagued property law for centuries.
WILLIAM S. PADDOCK
40 See notes 24, 27, and 31 supra & accompanying text.
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